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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
EQUITY-INJUNCTIVE RELIEF-INDUCING BREACH OF CON-
TRACT-TRADE LIBEL.--The plaintiff corporation alleged that it was
engaged in the production and distribution of motion pictures; that
it distributed its pictures to theatres for exhibition under license agree-
ments which provided that the advertising of the pictures must con-
form to certain formal and artistic standards set by the plaintiff; that
knowing these facts and circumstances, the defendant manufactured,
sold, and distributed advertising of the plaintiff's pictures which ad-
vertising was inartistic, grotesque, misleading, containing deceptive
information bringing discredit upon the pictures and damaging and
impairing the good will of the plaintiff as well as injuring and jeopar-
dizing its business integrity. On appeal by the plaintiff from a judg-
ment sustaining the demurrer, held, reversed. The plaintiff's com-
plaint that the defendant's advertising violated the license agreement
or wrongfully disparaged the plaintiff's business set forth a good
cause of action. Paramount Pictures, Inc., et al. v. Leader Press, Inc.,
106 F. (2d) 229 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939).
"The right to have one's contractual relations free from the dis-
ruptive influence of third parties has repeatedly been declared to be
a valuable property right, and thus entitled to the protection of a
court of equity provided the other grounds for equitable interposition
are present." 1 To establish the tort of interference with contractual
relations, most authorities agree that the element of malice has long
been supplanted by the test of foreseeability. 2 The primary consid-
eration is whether the defendant observed the proper standard of care
in his negotiations with respect to the already existing contract. That
standard is based upon the doctrine of foreseeability and if, as a rea-
sonable man, the defendant should have anticipated the results, the
standard has been violated.3 In the instant case, the court called the
conduct of the defendant in selling inferior advertising to the plain-
PRUDENCE (4th ed. 1919) § 1696: "Some courts have intimated that either a
general building scheme or an express declaration in the covenant is essential;
but the better view seems to be that the intent may be otherwise determined."
12 PoMERoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (2d ed. 1919) 4571. Accord: Central
Metal Corp. v. O'Brien, 218 Fed. 827 (D. C. 1922), appeal dismissed, 284 Fed.
850 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922) ; Second Nat. Bank v. Samuel and Sons, 12 F. (2d)
963 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 720, 47 Sup. Ct. 110 (1926).2 Carpenter, Interference With Contractual Relations (1928) 41 HARV. L.
REv. 728, 745; HARPER, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1933) 476; Chipley v.
Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206, 1 So. 134 (1877) ; Beekman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205,
80 N. E. 817 (1907).
3 Campbell v. Gates, 236 N. Y. 457, 141 N. E. 914 (1923) (The action of
C is malicious in that with knowledge of A's rights he intentionally and know-
ingly and for unworthy and selfish purposes violates them by inducing B to
breach his contract. It is a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause
or excuse, and from this a malicious motive is to be inferred. This does not
necessarily mean actual malice or ill-will but the intentional doing of a wrongful
act without legal or social justification. This action is predicated not on the
intent to injure, but on the intentional interference, without justification of A's
contractual rights, with knowledge thereof).
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RECENT DECISIONS
tiff's licensee a "wrongful contribution or inducement to the breach
of the license agreements." 4 Regardless of his motive or intent 5 the
wrongdoer will be held liable provided he acted with knowledge of
the existing contract, 6 unless he can show that his conduct was justi-
fiable or privileged in that he was advancing some public interest or
an equal or superior right of his own. 7 Justification cannot be based
on the defendant's freedom to enter into contracts where injury will
result to the contract rights of another although he is motivated by a
desire to further his own business interests.8 Nor does the fact that
the plaintiff and defendant are in competition offer justification.9
4 Instant case at 232.
5 Lamb v. Cheney & Son, 227 N. Y. 418, 125 N. E. 817 (1920) (It was
alleged that the defendant induced the plaintiff's employee to break his contract
with the plaintiff. The defense demurred. The court held the gist of the action
not to be the intent to injure, but to interfere without justification with knowl-
edge of the plaintiff's rights) ; Hornstein v. Podwitz, 254 N. Y. 443, 173 N. E.
674 (1930) ("Malicious" as malicious procurement of a breach of contract is
actionable, does not mean necessarily actual malice or ill-will but the intentional
doing of a wrongful act without legal or social justification) ; Mohammed Al
Raschid v. News Syndicate Co., Inc., 265 N. Y. 1, 191 N. E. 713 (1934);
Campbell v. Gates, 236 N. Y. 457, 141 N. E. 914 (1923) ("This action is not
predicated on the intent to injure but on the intentional interference without
justification of A's contractual rights with knowledge thereof") ; Husting Co.
v. Coca Cola Co., 205 Wis. 356, 237 N. W. 85 (1931), cert. denied, 285 U. S.
538, 52 Sup. Ct 311 (1931); Tubular Rivet and Steel Co. v. Exeter Boot &
Shoe Co., 159 Fed. 824 (C. C. A. 1st, 1908). Contra: Ashley v. Dixon, 48
N. Y. 430 (1872); Roseneau v. Empire Circuit Co., 131 App. Div. 429, 115
N. Y. Supp. 511 (4th Dept 1909) (The interfering party must be guilty of
some fraud or fraudulent representation).
GR. & W. Hat Shop v. Scully, 98 Conn. 1, 118 Atl. 55 (1922) (One who
acts in ignorance of an existing contract is guilty of no wrong); Robbins
Drydock, etc. Co. v. Flint, 275 U. S. 303, 48 Sup. Ct. 134 (1927). Contra:
Glanzer v. Shephard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922) ; Cue v. Breeland,
78 Miss. 864, 29 So. 850 (1901).
7 Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests
of Property and Personality (1926) 39 HARV. L. REv. 307, 314 ("Upon one
thing there is substantial agreement. An act intended to invade another's legally
protected interests is privileged only if done to protect or advance some public
interest or an interest of the actor. If the act is done only for the protection of
one of the actor's interests, it must be an interest of a value greater than, or at
least equal to, that of the interest invaded, or if the interests are similar, the
harm which the act is appropriate to prevent must be substantially equal to or
greater than that which it is intended or likely to cause") ; HARPER, TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1933) 7; R. & W. Hat Shop v. Scully, 98 Conn. 1, 118
At. 55 (1922); Brimelow v. Casson, [1923] 1 Ch. Div. 302; (1925) 38 HARV.
L. REv. 115; Northern Wisconsin Co-op. Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal, 182 Wis.
571, 97 N. W. 936 (1924).
8 Bitterman v. Louisville & N. R. R., 207 U. S. 205, 28 Sup. Ct. 91 (1907);
Lamb v. Cheney & Sons, 227 N. Y. 418, 125 N. E. 817 (1920) ; Standard Fash-
ion v. Segal-Cooper, 30 App. Div. 564, 52 N. Y. Supp. 433 (1st Dept. 1898) ;
Gonzales v. Kentucky Derby Co., 197 App. Div. 277, 189 N. Y. Supp. 783 (2d
Dept. 1921) ; Montgomery Enterprise Co. v. Empire Theater Co., 204 Ala. 566,
86 So. 880 (1920); Bowen v. Spear, 166 S. W. 1183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
9 Montgomery Enterprises Co. v. Empire Theater Co., 204 Ala. 566, 86 So.
880 (1920); E. L. Husting Co. v. Coca Cola, 205 Wis. 356, 237 N. W. 85
(1931), cert. denied, 285 U. S. 538, 52 Sup. Ct. 311 (1931) ; Heath v. American
1940]
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It is more difficult to follow the reasoning of the court in respect
to the other ground on which it based its decision, and which appears
somewhat unusual. The court cites Sections 626 and 629 of the Re-
statement of the Law of Torts 10 under the topic of Trade Libel.
Section 629 defines "disparagement" as "matter which is intended by
its publisher to be understood or which is reasonably understood to
cast doubt on another's property in lands, chattels or intangible things,
or upon their quality * * *." Courts in this country have consistently
denied injunctions against trade libels as they have against other libels,"
in order to uphold the constitutional guaranty of freedom of the press.
However, where the libel has been incidental or instrumental to an-
other tortious transaction equity has intervened.' 2 Therefore, it does
not seem in line with the great weight of judicial authorities 13 that
the cause of action should have been sustained on the separate ground
that the defendant was disparaging the plaintiff's business. But the
court may have construed the libelous acts as falling into the latter
category and enjoined them only as an incident of the tort of inducing
the breach of the plaintiff's contract.
B. S.
EVIDENCE - WIRE TAPPING - INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONs AcT.-(First Case) Defendants -appeal from a
judgment convicting them of smuggling and concealing alcohol and
of conspiracy to do so. An earlier conviction under the same indict-
ment was reversed by the Supreme Court on the ground that the ad-
mission of evidence directly procured by means of wire-tapping was
Book Co., 97 Fed. 533 (1899) ; Sumwalt Ice & Coal Co. v. Knickerbocker Ice
Co., 114 Md. 403, 80 At. 48 (1911); Beekman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205,
80 N. E. 817 (1907).
10 REsTATEMENT, ToRTs (1938) §§ 626, 629.
31 Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 Mass. 69 (1873); Marlin
Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N. Y. 384, 64 N. E. 163 (1902); Balliet v.
Cassidy, 104 Fed. 704 (1900) ; American Malting Co: v. Kreitel, 207 Fed. 351
(C. C. A. 2d, 1913); Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 Fed. 982
(D. C. Mo. 1912) ; (1927) 75 U. oF PA. L. REv. 258, 260.
12 Nann v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 317, 174 N. E. 690 (1931) (Equity does not
interfere to restrain the publication of words on a mere showing of their falsity.
It intervenes in those cases where restraint becomes essential to the preservation
of a business or other property interest thretened with impairment by an illegal
combination or 6-tfier tortious acts, the publication of the words being merely
instrumental and incidental); Gompers v. Buck Stove Co., 221 U. S. 418, 31
Sup. Ct 492 (1910) ; Casey v. Typographical Union, 45 Fed. 135 (C. C. S. D.
Ohio 1891) ; Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307 (1888).
13 Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality
(1915) 29 HARv. L. REv. 640; (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 258.
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